A World Full of Missiles

Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the proliferation and use of ballistic and cruise missiles. Much of this increase stems from Tehran and its large network of proxies. The Houthis, for example, have carried out missile campaigns against Saudi Arabia and shipping near the Horn of Africa. Iran lobbed missiles at the Al Asad Air Base in Iraq in January 2020. And Iran-backed militias hit the same facility with rockets in January 2024. The war in Ukraine also contributes to this trend, with the Russian military launching large-scale missile attacks against military and civilian targets. And although it is not engaged in active conflict, North Korea continues to remind the world that it has an active missile development program by conducting extensive and persistent testing.

This new world feels very different from the one that existed ten years ago. More state and nonstate actors today have access to these weapons, and in greater numbers than many predicted. In turn, states and militias are using them as powerful coercive tools. They are akin to fighter jets and bombers, except, unlike other forms of airpower, the challenge they pose is not their absolute destructive potential or accuracy. It is their ability to incessantly threaten and impose costs on defenders, regardless of whether the missiles are actually launched. This makes them a pernicious tool well suited for revanchist states and their proxies. The United States and its security partners will need new solutions to lower the day-to-day risks of this modern missile age.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Missiles have been used as coercive terror weapons for over 80 years. The world’s first ballistic missile—a rocket-propelled weapon with a parabolic trajectory—was the Nazi V-2. The Nazi’s V-1 flying bomb was considered one of the first cruise missiles—a weapon that charts its own path through the atmosphere, with an airplane-like trajectory. The Nazis used these weapons as part of a coercive “vengeance” campaign against Allied forces and British cities. They did not change the outcome of World War II, but they did kill over 15,000 people.

Soon, such weapons were adopted by other countries. The Soviet Union’s Scud was a short-range ballistic missile first deployed in 1955 that spread to over 20 states, making it the Kalashnikov of the missile world. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein used a mix of aircraft and Scud missiles to conduct punitive raids against Iranian cities. He again used Scuds against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War, which U.S.-built Patriot air defense systems had mixed results at intercepting.

Scuds and its many descendants are popular, in part, because they are a good substitute for aircraft-based power. Missiles require fewer people and equipment to use than planes. They do not risk pilots’ lives, are less costly, and require less supporting infrastructure. As a result, they have proliferated in use.

They have also become more effective. Missile attacks in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s featured small numbers of Scuds and were often unsuccessful, but recent attacks have been larger, more complex, and appear to have had a greater effect. The best example is the September 2019 attack on Saudi oil refineries by Iranian-sponsored groups, which used a mix of ballistic and cruise missiles to knock out roughly half of Saudi crude oil production.

The proliferation of ballistic missiles used by groups such as the Houthis is thanks, in no small part, to a partnership between Iran and North Korea. Tehran has been buying missiles from Pyongyang since the early 1990s, when Iran received a mix of over 200 Scuds from the country. Since then, the countries have shared missile components and designs. As international pariahs, both states have strong incentives to jointly develop advanced military capabilities. They also face a similar military challenge: denying the United States freedom of access and maneuver.

The United States and its security partners will need new solutions for the modern missile age.

Both states began parading and displaying their increasingly advanced arsenals. By the mid-2010s, Iran was able to use these weapons to achieve strategic objectives by funneling them to its proxies. In 2015, for example, the Houthis started using Iranian-made ballistic missiles to attack Saudi Arabia. Over the course of 2021, Riyadh said that the Houthis fired more than 1,200 missiles and drones at Saudi targets. This campaign proved incredibly difficult to outright counter, in part thanks to the sustained nature and the high volume of strikes. It also proved exceptionally difficult for Saudi Arabia to find and destroy Houthi launch infrastructure.

According to research by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, the Houthis have used these sustained missile strikes to try to achieve their political objectives. The project found, for example, a clear correlation between the volume of missile strikes and upcoming negotiations. In the same way that the United States attempted to pair strategic airpower with negotiated outcomes in Vietnam, the Houthis have attempted to pair negotiations with missiles.

Recently, both Iran and North Korea have begun supplying Russia—the nation that gave them their first ballistic missiles—in its ongoing war against Ukraine. This support has, according to reports by Conflict Armament Research and Reuters, included advanced short-range ballistic missiles such as the North Korean “Kimskander” and the Iranian Fateh-110. Moscow is now relying on a mix of missiles and Iranian drones to impose costs on the Ukrainian people, which is the same strategy adopted by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and global shipping. Although the Houthis’ mix of cruise, ballistic, and drone attacks has been mostly unsuccessful at sinking ships, it has managed to divert a significant amount of shipping traffic around Africa, raising prices for global commerce and extracting significant costs on the countries (such as the United States) trying to safeguard the world’s commons. The large numbers of successful missile intercepts and strikes on Houthi targets tell a good news story for the coalition. But their inability to end to these attacks, along with the significant military forces they have had to assign, tells another.

NUMBERS AND TIME

Whether in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East, the modern missile age appears to be defined by ballistic and cruise weapons complicating adversary defenses. But this obscures a deeper change underway. Traditional understandings of coercive airpower feature large amounts of damage, short timelines, or both. Yet the modern missile age is more akin to guerilla warfare than to nuclear deterrence, strategic bombing, or even the large-scale precision strike approaches favored by U.S. planners—all of which stress conducting speedy operations. Instead, the modern missile age is defined by using a smaller number of weapons compared with historical bombing campaigns, but over a considerably longer period.

Part of why missiles are effective asymmetric tools is that they impose a persistent cost. Both states and militias are now able to field these weapons with a degree of sustainability they previously lacked, firing hundreds of missiles when many of them could once only fire a handful. Such attacks may not lead to a night of shock and awe or a knockout blow. But they can lead to death by a thousand cuts, delivered from hundreds of miles away over the course of weeks, months, and even years. And compared with drones, they deliver considerably heavier warheads over longer ranges and can be much more difficult to intercept once detected.

Countering these new missile threats is difficult. Amassing naval hardware, supplying weapons to intercept incoming missiles, and destroying launch sites is not cheap—a fact that’s illustrated by Washington’s mission in the Red Sea. But it is not impossible. Advanced sensors and weapons can make it easier for militaries to take out missiles before they launch. Directed energy and gun-based defensive weapons can reduce the costs of interception. Such technologies can make using such missiles less appealing.

Missiles are effective asymmetric tools because they impose a persistent cost.

What states cannot easily address is the price of continuous defensive operations. This is a toll paid not just in money, manpower, and material but also focus. Maintaining a constant condition of high alert drains a military of its readiness, in part by taking a toll on the concentration of personnel. Unfortunately, solving this problem is likely impossible. If the United States wants to maintain its role as the international security guarantor in today’s missile age, it must reckon with this growing cost.

Defense officials should frame such a reckoning in terms of mitigation rather than as an outright counter, given that there are no silver bullets for the problems caused by missiles. At a minimum, Washington will need to increase the number of personnel devoted to the air defense mission. The Pentagon needs to pair this increase in personnel with enhanced international cooperation, sharing vital air defense information with allies and partners at the system level. The goal should be to achieve true interoperability rather than just collaboration.

Taking these steps will be increasingly important as the modern missile age expands beyond Ukraine and the Middle East. Although global missile proliferation today relies primarily on Iran and North Korea, it is likely to expand as commercial space activities democratize access to fundamental missile technology. Both state and nonstate groups are increasingly recognizing the coercive power of these missile arsenals. Places such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Myanmar are all plausible new locations for missile proliferation. The United States, its allies, and its partners must understand that the modern missile age—with its pernicious costs and uncomfortable realities—is here to stay.